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households based on past electricity usage, or if we gain by adding structural characteristics of
the home, including heating system type. We find that the two programs reduce electricity usage
by 5% on average. The effects are strong in both winter and summer for the energy audit group
but appear to be stronger in the winter for the heat pump rebate group. Adding house
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Information v. Energy Efficiency Incentives:
Evidence from Residential Electricity Consumption in Maryland
By Anna Alberini and Charles Towe

1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the savings in residential electricity usage that
can be attributed to energy efficiency programs. We focus on two such programs. The first is a
home energy audit offered to customers free of charge, where information is provided to the
consumer about ways to save energy and money, and the consumer is free to choose which
advice to implement, and when. The second is a rebate on the purchase of a high-efficiency heat
pump, a device used for heating the home in the winter and cooling it in the summer that is very
common in our study area due to its climatic conditions (hot summers and winters marked with
only brief exposure to extreme cold).
The two programs rely on completely different approaches to encouraging energy
efficiency investments in the home: The former provides information at low or no cost to the
consumer, while the latter lowers the capital cost of the investment. We interpret participation in
either of these two programs as a “treatment” in the context of an experiment with residential
electricity consumption as the outcome. We assess the effect of the treatment using a unique
panel of data on electricity usage before and after the time of the program for both the
participating households and suitable control households.
Environmental issues and climate change concerns have led to a resurgence of residential
energy efficiency programs by policymakers and utilities wishing to reduce energy usage and the
CO2 emissions associated with electricity generation. Well publicized and influential reports
(IPCC 2007, McKinsey, 2009) have identified energy efficiency improvements in buildings as
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capable of delivering CO2 emissions reductions at low or even negative cost, and in the US in
fiscal year 2013 federal expenditures on preferential tax policies targeting energy efficiency
improvements in existing and new homes came to a total of almost $4 billion (Dinan, 2013).
Residential efficiency programs were popular among the utilities in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, when they were part of the utilities’ demand-side management programs, which
attempted to reduce electricity usage to avoid or postpone expensive capital expenditures and
reduce peak load. However, the cost-effectiveness of these measures was and still is difficult to
study, due to adverse selection and the likelihood that these programs attract people who are
systematically (and unobservably) more motivated or productive at reducing electricity usage
(Joskow and Marron, 1992; Hartman, 1988; Waldman and Ozog, 1996; Allaire and Brown,
2012). As a result, considerable debate remains about the cost-effectiveness of these programs
(Loughran and Kulik, 2004; Auffhammer et al., 2008).
Ideally, one would want to evaluate residential energy efficiency programs by conducting
randomized controlled trials, where households are exogenously assigned to treatments of
different type or intensity (Davis, 2008). Alternatively, it might be possible to devise
circumstances that are plausibly interpreted as natural experiments (Gans et al., 2013). Our study
lends itself to neither of these criteria nor do we have plausible instruments for participation.
Fortunately, we do have the data necessary to implement a retrospective case-control study and
address these problems. We capture all confounders through a “triple difference” approach that
lets log household electricity usage depend on the weather, household-by-season fixed effects,
season-by-year fixed effects, and household-by-year fixed effects. This setup takes advantage of
the panel nature of our dataset.
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We also match treated households with similar control households, based on (i)
electricity usage in the benchmark year (2008), or (ii) electricity usage in the benchmark year
plus structural characteristics of the home. Matching restores balance across treatment and
control households and in theory makes treatment as good as randomly assigned conditional on
our rich set of observables
One question we address in this paper is whether it is sufficient to match treated and
control observations on past usage (usage during 2008, our benchmark year) or we gain by
creating matching strata based on past usage and structural characteristics of the dwelling.
Clearly, the former approach is coarser and results in more numerous matches (and hence a
larger sample size), while the latter is more precise, but requires information beyond the mere
usage history of the households, and by design may discard many more units.
If past electricity usage is sufficient to describe completely a household’s energy usage
patterns, then adding house characteristics should not make much difference in terms of the
results of the matching exercise. If, on the other hand, structural characteristics of the dwelling
help explain usage and/or participation in the utility program and contribute to covariate
imbalance, then the matching exercise will give different results when we add the structural
characteristics. We do not have a priori expectations on whether the two approaches produce
very different results, but we note that recent literature about the effects of novel tariffs or utility
program has often relied on just past usage, with no information about the structural
characteristics of the dwelling (Auffhammer, 2014).
We use coarsened exact matching (Iacus et al., 2011) to match households, and apply the
resulting weights in regressions that use the full panel of observations. We compare the results
from this approach with standard matching (Abadie and Imbens, 2006, 2011) and propensity
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score matching (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999 and 2002) for cross-sections drawn from our full
sample.
Briefly, we find that the energy audit and rebates on the purchase of high-efficiency airsource heat pumps resulted in 5% reductions in the use of the electricity. The savings appear to
be equally strong in the winter and summer in the case of the energy audits, and the results are
sharper when matching is done on both past usage and house characteristics, despite the
considerable trimming the sample is subjected to. With the heat pump rebates, the savings accrue
primarily in the winter. In sum, our results suggest that matching on only past usage may not be
enough, and that usage data should be augmented with house and/or household characteristics
when possible.
Our paper is different from recent work in the area of “information” about energy usage,
which has focused on examining whether more frequent feedback on usage than the conventional
billing frequency, simplified or reformulated bills, or real-time feedback on usage through inhome displays (alone or combined with dynamic pricing) change household energy consumption
(Faruqui et al., 2010; Gans et al. 2013; Jessoe and Rapson, 2013).We contribute to the strand of
literature that has sought to assess energy-efficiency incentive programs by examining the uptake
of such incentives (Hassett and Metcalf, 1995), free riding in their presence (Boomhower and
Davis, 2014) and apparent rebound effects potentially induced by the availability of these
incentives (Alberini et al., 2014).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background
for our study. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 lays out the econometric model and
methods. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 offers concluding remarks.
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2. Background
In 2008, the state of Maryland established the EmPower Maryland Program, with the
goal of reducing energy consumption by 15% by 2015. Participating electric and gas utilities set
up a number of initiatives to help meet this goal, including—starting in January 2010—rebates of
$200 and $400 on the purchase of air-source heat pumps in tier I and tier II, respectively. This
rebate structure remained in place for all of 2010 and 2011, and was revised in January 2012,
when rebates were extended to tier III heat pumps and ductless mini-split heat pumps that met
specific energy efficiency requirements. The electric utility that serves the study area is a
participant in the EmPower Maryland program.
In January 2011 the participating utilities started home energy audit programs. In this
paper we examine the effects on energy usage of the simplest and least time-consuming of these
audits—the Quick Home Energy Check-up (QHEC). In the QHEC, a professional performs a
one-hour walk through the home to assess insulation levels, air leakage, heating and cooling
systems, windows and doors, lighting and appliances, and water heating equipment. A report is
prepared and handed to the homeowner that summarizes findings and recommends
improvements and opportunities to save energy use and costs. Equipment and supplies, such as
compact fluorescent light bulbs, faucet aerators, efficient-flow showerheads, water pipe
insulation or water heater tank wraps, are offered. The QHEC is free to the residential customer
and costs about $200 to the utility (which employs a contractor to do this service).
We do not know exactly what a household does after the free energy audit. It is possible
that, in addition to accepting and installing the products offered at the time of the QHEC, the
audited households replace major equipment or install insulation, but we do not know this.

7
We wish to assess the effect on electricity usage of participation in the heat pump rebate
program or the QHEC in first quarter of 2011. As mentioned, the goal of the rebate and the
QHEC program is to help the utilities meet the requirements of the EmPower Maryland program,
which in turn aims at a 15% reduction in energy use and at the associated CO2 emissions.
Additional incentives have been available from the federal government in the form of tax credits
on the purchase of high-efficiency heat pumps since 2006, with major revisions to tax credits and
caps in 2009 as part of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act.

3. The Data
We have assembled a unique dataset from state and private sources which contains
monthly electricity usage and bills for a sample of about 17,000 households in Maryland. This
sample is comprised of households who received a Quick Home Energy Check-up (QHEC) or a
rebate for an energy-efficient air-source heat pump in the first quarter of 2011 (Q1 2011), plus
households living in homes that are representative for age and construction type of the stock of
single-family homes and townhomes in the area served by the utility, but did not participate in
any utility programs during our study period.
Although the local utility provided us with monthly billing and usage information from as
early as December 2006, in this paper attention is restricted to 2008-2012. Specifically, we use
observations from 2008 for benchmarking purposes, and 2009 and the later years for analysis
purposes (see the time line in figure 1). We use 2008 for benchmarking as this period was one of
little or no programmatic activity targeted at energy efficiency. Since we are interested in
assessing the effect of audits and incentives towards a major heating and cooling device, we
exclude from the sample households that received multiple incentives during our study period or
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during any period after the first quarter of 2011. We include in our sample only households with
accounts that were active in 2008 and remained active until at least Q2 2011 at the same home.
Our cleaned sample is thus comprised of 378 QHEC households, 430 households who received a
rebate on the purchase of air-source heat pumps with SEER of 14 or better, and 10,676 “control”
households.2 A total of 6,645 out of these 10,676 households live in homes served by air-source
heat pumps.
Information about electricity usage for this cleaned sample is displayed in table 1. Annual
average consumption in 2008, our “benchmark” year, ranges from 17,000 to over 20,000 kWh.
This figure is above the US average (which is about 11,000 kWh3), in part because of the
reliance on air conditioning in the summer in our study area and because over half of the homes
in our sample are served by air-source heat pumps, which are heavy users of electricity. T tests
(reportd in table 2) fail to reject the null that the audit and the control households have different
mean consumption levels in 2008, and find that rebate recipients are significantly different from
the full control group (control group (a)) and those in the control group that use heat pumps as
their main heating and cooling system (control group (b)).
The distributions of electricity usage in 2008 for the different groups of households are
depicted in figures 2 and 3. The figures suggests that, after some trimming at the upper end of the
distribution, there is a wide common support for 2008 usage for treatment and control
households.
Table 1 also reports information about electricity usage in 2009, 2010, 2011, and Q2
2011 – Q1 2012, i.e., the twelve months after the utility programs. Usage appears to be

2

The original sample contained a total of 1300 households who received a QHEC or a heat pump rebate in Q1 2011,
so our data cleaning procedures drop about one-third of the original households that participated in these utility
programs in Q1 2011.
3
See http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=97&t=3 (last accessed 26 December 2014).
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especially high in 2009 and 2010 among the recipients of the heat pump rebates, and appears to
decline substantially thereafter. Control households that use heat pump experience a
comparatively much more modest decline in usage.
For each of the homes in our sample, we have extensive information about the structural
characteristics of the dwelling and the type of heating and cooling system. This information
comes from MDPropertyView, a database compiled by the State of Maryland that documents all
properties in the state. Descriptive statistics of selected housing characteristics from
MDPropertyView are displayed in table 3. Briefly, the average home is about 1900 square feet
and 62% of the homes use heat pumps as their main heating and cooling systems. The bulk of
the homes in our sample—some 60%--were built in the 1980s and 1990s, and a majority (over
54%) are classified as of “average” construction quality. We note that higher construction quality
includes “tighter” homes with regard to energy efficiency.
In table 4 we compare the structural characteristics of the homes across groups—the two
treated groups, the full control group (control group (a)), and the subset of the control group that
use heat pumps (control group (b)). This comparison suggests that the QHEC group and the full
control group are reasonably similar to each other, as are the heat pump rebate group and the
controls with heat pumps. Some differences exist, however, in terms of the share of relatively
new homes, construction quality, presence of basement and construction techniques and
materials.
Finally, we use the daily average temperature in our study area from the National
Climatic Data Center’s Global Summary of the Day to compute daily heating and cooling degree
days (HDDs and CDDs, respectively). Since the weather is a major determinant of the demand
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for electricity, we aggregate daily HDDs and CDDs to the seasonal totals and enter them in the
right-hand side of our regressions.

4. Econometric Approach
A. The Model
We are interested in assessing the effect of two alternate treatments, the energy audit and
the rebate on the purchase of an efficient heat pump, on electricity consumption. We focus on
households that received the energy audit, or received and redeemed the rebate for a new heat
pump, in Q1 2011. We have their electricity consumption before and after Q1 2011, but do not
know exactly when the audit took place or the heat pump was installed within the first quarter of
2011. For this reason, we aggregate the monthly electricity usage records to seasonal totals, and
in our estimations (described below) we exclude the observations from Q1 2011. Electricity
consumption is likewise aggregated to seasonal totals over the same study period for the control
subjects. We define the seasons as winter (season 1), which is comprised of December, January,
February, and March, spring (April and May), summer (June, July, August and September), and
fall (October and November). In our study region, electricity consumption is especially high in
the winter and the summer (even if we account for the different lengths of these seasons
compared to spring and fall). This pattern is clear in figures 4 and 5, which display average log
seasonal electricity use by customer group.
To control for all possible confounders, we estimate the following “difference-indifference-in-difference” equation:
(1)`

ln Eist   is   st   it  Wist   Dist     ist ,
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where E is household’s i electricity usage in season s in year t,  is denotes a household-byseason fixed effect,  st a season-by-year fixed effect, and  it a household-by-year fixed effect.
Wist is a vector of weather controls, and Dist is the treatment dummy. We are especially

interested in estimating , the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).
The household-by-season fixed effects capture preferences for a warm house in the
winter and a cool house in the summer, insulation and ventilation characteristics of the home, the
presence of tree shade, etc. The season-by-year fixed effects capture the shocks represented by
unusually cold or warm winters or summers, and the household-by-year fixed effects any
changes in the composition of the household or structural characteristics of the home from one
year to the next that may influence electricity usage.4 The effect of the treatment is identified by
variation within the household-season-year cell.
In practice, equation (1) implies a large number of household fixed effects—a total of 16
effects per household times the over 10,000 households. Estimation is simplified by first taking
the fourth-lag difference, namely the difference between each observation and its counterpart
from the same season one year earlier. This swipes out the household-by-season fixed effects
and yields
(2)

ln Eist  ln Eis,t 1   st   it  (Wist  Wis ,t 1 )  ( Dist  Dis,t 1 )    eist ,

where  st and  it denote new season-by-year and household-by-year fixed effects.
In certain runs, as when the sample is restricted to the summer just before and that just
after participation in the utility program, the fourth lag difference results in a single observation

4

The household-by-season and the season-by-year fixed effects also account for the different lengths of winter and
summer compared to the other seasons.
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per household. It is therefore not possible to fit a model with household-by-year fixed effects,
and we estimate a simplified version of the “triple difference” model, namely:

ln Eist  ln Eis ,t 1   st  (Wist  Wis ,t 1 )  ( Dist  Dis,t 1 )    eist .

(3)

While the interactions between the household, season and year units should help capture
unobserved heterogeneity, equation (1) is linear in the logs of the continuous variables and the
treatment dummy, which means that the model relies on extrapolation if certain cells are sparsely
populated or are imbalanced with respect to the treatment and control households. To
circumvent this problem, we deploy matching techniques in order to restore balance and near or
plausible exogeneity of the treatment.

B. Matching
For each treated household, we look for a match, namely a control household with
roughly the same levels of electricity usage in 2008 and/or similar dwelling characteristics. The
simplest way to estimate the ATT is to compute the difference between log usage for each
treated household and its control-group match, and then average these differences over all
possible pairs of matched households.
We remind the reader that average treatment effect is defined as
(4)

𝛾 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1 | 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷 = 1)

where 𝑌1 denotes the outcome for a household in the treated state, 𝑌0 denotes the outcome in the
untreated state, and D indicates treatment status—in our case either participation in the audit or
rebate program (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Of course, we cannot observe 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷 = 1) (the
untreated outcome for treated households) which leads to utilizing data from the 𝐷 = 0 group to
estimate 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝐷 = 0). All matching estimators of the ATT are weighting estimators of the form
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1

∆= 𝑛 ∑𝑖∈{𝐷𝑖 =1} [𝑌1𝑖 − ∑𝑗∈{𝐷𝑗=0} 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) 𝑌0𝑗 ]

(5)

1

where 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) sums to 1 for all i. These estimators are exact matching estimators, which means
we can simply construct matches without concern for selection into the treatment. Application of
matching estimators in observational data requires addressing this selection issue conditional on
a rich set of observables, X, which in our case include historical usage and dwelling
characteristics.
If the matching covariates X are solely binary indicators or categorical variables, then it
is straightforward to construct strata defined by all possible combinations of X values and place
the treated households and the controls in the appropriate stratum. The control households in the
same stratum as any given treated households serve as matches for the latter. Under mild
assumptions, the ATT in (5) is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed.
The inability to match for each continuous variable in X leads to usage of inexact
matching estimators, such as distance-based measures as in Abadie and Imbens (2011) and
propensity score approaches as first employed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).These
approaches produce a measure of the ATT based upon
(6)

𝛾 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌1 |𝑔(𝑋), 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0 |𝑔(𝑋), 𝐷 = 0),

differing only in the construction of g(X) but all assuming implicitly or explicitly that (𝑌0 ⊥
𝐷)|𝑔(𝑋), i.e., that conditional on X treatment is as good as randomly assigned. This is the socalled conditional independence assumption.
In Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011) a measure of distance between households (e.g., the
Euclidean or Mahalanobis distance) is constructed, and the closest match to a treated household
is thus the control household at the shortest distance from the treated household. Abadie and
Imbens (2011) show that in this case, the matching estimator in equation (5) is biased for the true
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ATT, propose a regression-based bias correction, and derive the asymptotic variance of the biascorrected estimator, which is asymptotically normal (Abadie and Imbens, 2006).
A convenient and computationally less intensive alternative is to deploy propensity score
matching, which relies on the fact that conditioning on the propensity score (a single-index
value) is equivalent to conditioning on X. One first fits a logit or probit model to explain
treatment status as a function of the covariates X, and computes a predicted probability of
treatment pi for each household. Each treated household is matched with the control household(s)
with the closest pi, and the ATT is computed using equation (6) under a variety of weighting
schemes for w(i,j) from equation (5).5 One then checks that the covariates are balanced post
matching, which hopefully implies that conditional independence is satisfied. However, neither
approach guarantees that the matched samples will be balanced with respect to the covariates X.
Both approaches can be relatively time-consuming to implement. Iacus et al. (2011) propose
coarsened exact matching (CEM) to get around these two limitations.
With CEM, continuous variables are converted to discrete interval data, and exact
matching strata are constructed. The algorithm that implements this conversion seeks to select
intervals that make the treated units and their matches among the controls balanced with respect
to X. The procedure produces weights. Unmatched units receive a weight of zero. Matched units
receive a weight equal to one if they belong to the treatment group, and

mC mTs

if they belong
mT mCs

to the control group, where mC is the total number of control units, mT is the total number of

5

In practice, by changing the definition of w(i, j) it is possible to identify multiple matches for each treated
household including kernel approaches that weight “near” observations more heavily than distant observations or
uniform approaches such as single or many nearest neighbors each weighted equally. They may also impose
additional requirement on the matches (for instance, that they lie within a specified radius or “caliper” around each
treated unit).
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treatment units, and mCs and mTs are their counterparts in stratum s. The weights make the
treatment and control groups balanced with respect to X.6
Finally, one runs regression (3), where the right-hand side is augmented with the
matching variables to control for any residual imbalance, by weighted least squares, where the
weights are the CEM weights. Iacus et al. (2011) compare various matching approaches using
Monte Carlo simulations and conclude that CEM outperforms the others in terms of bias and
variance of the ATT, as well as execution time. For this reason, we deploy CEM in this paper as
our primary matching method, and run the final weighted least square regression using the full
panel dataset.
We perform each matching exercise twice, first using energy usage in the winter and the
summer of 2008 (well before participation in the utility’s programs) as the matching variables,
and then again with a broader set of matching variables—namely 2008 winter and summer usage
and house characteristics, including the type of heating system. The first approach considers a
treatment and control household a matched pair if their 2008 winter and summer electricity
consumptions levels were roughly the same. We expect the second approach to be more
stringent: the two households would not be considered good matches for each other if, for
example, one of them had a very large house and the other a very small house, as the implied
energy intensities would be very different.
We wish to check if the estimation results are very sensitive to using a coarser matching
criterion (prior usage only), which presumably yields more matched households, versus a more
stringent one, which is expected to yield fewer matches, for a smaller final sample size. We
6

Unless restrictions are imposed on the CEM algorithm by the researcher, CEM will by default uses all possible
matches for the treated units, and is thus different from distance-based approaches or propensity score matching,
where the number of matches used to estimate the ATT is arbitrarily defined by the researcher. Using CEM allows
more matches where the counterfactuals are thick and fewer matches where good counterfactuals do not exist.

16
emphasize that the former approach is easily deployed when the only information about
households available to the researcher is their usage itself (i.e., the billing and usage data from
the utility), while the latter is possible only when usage data are merged with household or house
structure information.
As a robustness check, we also estimate the ATT using both a traditional matching
method based on minimizing the Mahalanobis distance and propensity score matching. Both use
cross-sectional samples from control and program participating households from season s and
year t, where s and t are post-treatment periods for the participating households. For consistency
with equation (3), the outcome variable is the difference between log electricity usage in season s
in year and its counterpart in the same season the prior year.

5. Results
A. Main Results
We begin our discussion of the estimation results with those for the QHEC energy audit
treatment. The results of the CEM where the matching variables are 2008 winter and summer
usage are reported in table 5. We dub this “CEM 1.” Most of the households, and their seasonal
usage totals, are retained in the final regressions. The CEM 1-weighted averages of the matching
variables (the household’s winter and summer usage in 2008) are virtually identical across the
treatment and control households (first panel of table 6).
Table 7, column (A), reports the results from fitting the triple difference model without
attempting to trim the sample or attain covariate balance. The QHEC appears to reduce usage by
2.74%, but this effect is only marginally statistically significant at the 5% level. When the same
model is re-run with the CEM 1 weights, the average treatment effect of participating in the
energy audit program is similar, and statistically weaker (the t statistic is -1.75, which indicates
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significance at the 10% level). When attention is restricted to summertime billing cycles
(columns (C) and (D)), participation in the home energy audit program brings a slightly stronger
reduction in energy use (a 3.3% decline), which is again marginally statistically significant at the
5% level.
The second CEM approach (“CEM 2”) uses 2008 winter and summer usage and dwelling
characteristics to create the matching strata. As shown in table 5, this discards many more
observations than CEM 1. Only about one-third of the available sample is retained in the final
regression. The CEM 2-weighted averages of the matching variables are, again, practically
identical across the treatment and control groups (second panel of table 6).
In spite of the dramatically smaller sample used in the final regression (where we control
for 2008 electricity usage and dwelling characteristics), when applying the CEM 2 weights the
average treatment effect of QHEC is stronger, indicating a decline in usage by up to 5.5%.
Summertime savings in electricity usage are of similar magnitude, and likewise statistically
significant at the conventional levels.
Turning attention to the other treatment—the heat pump rebate—the results of the CEM
algorithms are similar to those with the home energy audit. If the matching variables are limited
to 2008 winter and summer usage levels, then some 98% of the households are matched. When
house characteristics are further included, only about one-third of the households are matched
controls, and so the final sample size for the regression is greatly reduced (table 9).
We run the triple difference model of equation (1) without any weights or trimming the
sample, and the results are displayed in table 10, column (A). They indicate that participating in
the heat pump rebate program (which means that the existing heat pump is replaced with an
energy-efficient one) brings a 5.3% reduction in energy usage. On trimming the sample and
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applying either set of CEM weights—CEM 1 or CEM 2—the average treatment effect of
changing the heat pump becomes slightly smaller (a 4% reduction in electricity usage) but
remains strongly statistically significant (table 10).
Quantifying the summertime savings is, however, more difficult. If the CEM 1 weights
are applied, replacing the heat pump seems to produce 3.7% reductions in electricity usage, but
the summertime average treatment effect is much smaller (about 2%), and statistically
insignificant, when we use the CEM 2 weights (table 11).

B. Robustness Checks
The results discussed so far are based on utilizing the full panel dataset—obviously our
preferred approach. We also created cross-sections from the existing panel dataset, and used
them to apply propensity score and distance-based matching algorithms. The results derived
from these estimation approaches provide useful robustness checks. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the
Appendix present results from the PSM and distance based estimators across multiple choices for
nearest neighbor, again with and without structural characteristics included in the matching
variables.
There is ample evidence of variability in these results if one compares results across
matching approaches or within approaches using different numbers of neighbors or a richer set of
matching variables (usage and dwelling data). In both rebate and audit treatments the strongest
effects arise from the heaviest usage period during the summer months with the audit reduction
of 4 to 5% and the rebate reduction in differences of ~3%. While the preponderance of results are
of similar magnitude and significance to our preferred specification and approach (CEM plus the
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panel), this variability and reliance on the researcher’s choice of the number of neighbors make
the CEM weighting approach all the more attractive.

6. Conclusions.
We have used a unique set of data from Maryland that combines electricity usage levels
and utility program participation records with structural characteristics of the dwelling to
estimate the electricity usage reductions that can be attributed to residential energy audits and
incentives to replace existing heat pumps with new, and more energy efficient, ones. We have
observations on usage for participating households and for a group of similar, non-participating
households, which we regard as control units. We have observations on usage before and after
program participation (which took place in Q1 2011) for all households.
Since program participation is voluntary, naïve estimates of its effects are likely affected
by selection bias, which we have attempted to address by deploying household-by-season fixed
effects, season-by-year fixed effects, and household-by-year fixed effects, plus matching
methods to restore a quasi-experiment design. Most applications of matching methods in
economics are for cross-sections. By contrast, our dataset is a panel, and we fully exploit it by
applying coarsened exact matching on households and then running regressions that use the full
panel of observations on usage.
Our findings suggests that past usage alone—as is often done in studies that lack
information among other determinants of residential energy usage, such as house and household
characteristics (e.g., Ito, 2014)—may not be not sufficient and that house characteristics are
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important. We find that residential energy audits reduce usage by about 5%, and that the heat
pump rebate has an effect of similar magnitude.7
For policy purposes, it is of interest to compute the cost-effectiveness of these programs,
namely the cost per ton of CO2 emissions removed. With our programs, however, these
calculations are not simple. Consider for example the QHEC program. Starting from a baseline
of 18,000 kWh per year, a 5% reduction implies that 900 kWh are saved per year. Since we do
not know whether these savings were attained with simple behavioral changes or by replacing
equipment or making other energy-efficiency investments, it is difficult to say what the time
horizon over which these savings are accrued is.
If we assume that it is 7 years (as assumed by the utility), then a participating household
would avoid 3.830 tons of CO2. Assuming that the cost of the audit to the utility is $200, and
that an additional $60 worth of products are offered to the household, for a total of $260 per
QHEC, then the cost per ton of CO2 emissions abated is $67.88.8 The cost falls to $47.50 per
ton of CO emissions if we assume that the usage reductions would be sustained for 10 years.
This is above the $21 “typical” social cost of carbon used by federal agencies in benefit-cost
analyses, but well within the range of values in Greenstone et al. (2013), which are obtained
under various scenarios and discount rate assumptions.
With the heat pumps rebate, we assume that the lifetime of a heat pump is 10 years, a
figure commonly indicated in utility and federal government agency calculations. This means
that, starting from a baseline of 21,000 kWh a year and assuming a rebate of $400, the cost per
ton of CO2 emissions avoided is about $59. The problem with this calculation is that evidence
from other studies (Boomhower and Davis, 2014; Alberini et al., 2014), and the high levels of
7

This is a greater saving that than estimated by the utility, which is 375 kWh a year. See
http://www.smeco.coop/saveEnergy/quickHomeEnergyCheckup/comparisonChart.aspx (accessed 13 June 2014).
8
We assume 0.608 Kg of CO2 emissions per kWh generated.
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usage observed in our own sample prior to replacing the heat pump, suggest that people replace
heat pumps when their existing equipment is about to die and essentially free ride on the
incentives. Since we find that replacing heat pumps with new and more efficient ones does
indeed decrease energy usage, energy efficiency standards for new heat pumps might be
sufficient to ensure such usage reductions, which would presumably occur at no additional cost
to the entity issuing the rebates.
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Figure 1. Time line.
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Figure 2. Density of 2008 electricity usage. Households who received a heat pump rebate v.
control households with heat pumps.
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Figure 3. Density of 2008 electricity usage. Households who received a Quick Home Energy
Check-up (QHEC) v. control households.
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Figure 4. Average log electricity consumption by season. Household who received a Quick
Home Energy Check-up (energy audit) v. control households.
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Figure 5. Average log electricity consumption by season. Household who received heat pump
rebates v. control households with heat pumps.
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Table 1. Electricity consumption by year and household group.
N
Mean
Mean
Mean
electricity
electricity electricity
usage in
usage in
usage in
2008
2009
2010
(benchmark (kWh)
(kWh)
year) (kWh)
Audit (QHEC)
378
17,438
18,046
19.049
Control group
10676 17,385
17,652
17,853
(control group (a)
Heat pump rebate
430
20,136
21,154
21,950
Control group with 6645
18,586
18,893
18,963
heat pump (control
group (b))

Mean
electricity
usage in
2011
(kWh)
17,640
17,970

Mean
electricity
usage Q2
2011 –
Q1 2012
(kWh)
16,407
16,846

19,775
18,902

18,222
17,479

Table 2. 2008 electricity usage comparison across groups.

Audit (QHEC) v. control group (a)
Heat pump rebate v. control group (a)
Heat pump rebate v. control group with heat pumps (control
group (b))

T statistic of the null that the
group means are the same
-0.1065
-6.9494
-3.8586
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the sample. N=11,552 households.
Sqft feet
Basement present
Brick construction
Frame construction
Siding
Single family home
Heat pump present
Built before 1960
Built 1960-69
Built 1970-79
Built 1980-89
Built 1990-99
Built 2000 and later
1 floor
2 floors
2.5 floors
3 floors
Missing floor info
Fair construction quality
Average construction quality
Good construction quality
Very good construction quality
Other construction quality

Mean (unless otherwise indicated)
Mean 1928.19
Median 1808
0.4209
0.0828
0.1229
0.7337
0.8800
0.6225
0.0594
0.0649
0.1572
0.2170
0.3921
0.1094
0.3198
0.5583
0.0065
0.0132
0.1022
0.3544
0.5414
0.0776
0.0088
0.0178

30
Table 4. Comparison of structural characteristics of the homes by group.

1917.95 1931.22
0.6085 0.6224
0.3052 0.4285
0.0736 0.1238
0.1062 0.0832
0.7411
0.731
0.0763 0.0612
0.0518 0.0665
0.2071 0.1565
0.2507 0.2124
0.3787 0.3879
0.0354 0.1155
0.3578 0.3540
0.6147 0.6236
0.0122 0.0074
0.0153 0.0150

-0.33
-0.52
-5.02**
-3.59**
1.41
0.43
1.07
1.25
2.36*
1.67
-0.36
-7.89**
0.14
-0.33
0.79
0.04

2072.4
1.0000
0.4332
0.1217
0.0534
0.813
0.0059
0.0059
0.0356
0.3145
0.5964
0.0415
0.2614
0.732
0.0033
0.0033

2029.01
1.0000
0.4582
0.0908
0.0420
0.8413
0.0104
0.0051
0.0508
0.2735
0.5117
0.1485
0.2461
0.7205
0.0103
0.0232

Group
means t
test
(HP
rebate
v.
control
group
w/ heat
pumps)
1.07
--0.90
1.70
0.91
-1.30
-1.03
0.20
-1.45
1.58
3.08**
-9.10**
0.60
0.44
-1.98*
-5.23**

0.4796

0.5404

-2.29*

0.6291

0.6113

0.66

0.4142
0.0899

0.3559
0.0770

2.23*
0.85

0.2463
0.1128

0.2721
0.1011

1.07
0.66

0.0054

0.0092

-0.94

0.0089

0.0133

0.84

Audit

Sqft
heat pump
Basement
Frame
Brick
Siding
Built Pre 1960
Built 1960-69
Built 1970-79
Built 1980-89
Built 1990-2000
Built 2000+
1 floor
2 floors
2.5 floors
3 floors
Average construction
quality
Fair construction quality
Good construction quality
Very good construction
quality
* = significant at the 5% level
** = significant at the 1% level

Group
means
t test
(audit
Control
v.
Group
control
(a)
group)

HP
Rebate

Control
Group w/
heat
pump (b)
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Table 5. Coarsened exact matching (CEM) results. QHEC households v. control households.

CEM 1

CEM 2

Matching variables

- 2008 usage

- 2008 usage
- House characteristics

Matched households

10,580
(97.85%)

3603
(33.33%)

Nobs used in the final regression

177,550
(97.88%)

60,763
(33.50%)
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Table 6. Weighted means of matching variables in the QHEC treatment and control groups.
Model

Variable

control
group

CEM1

summer 2008 usage
winter 2008 usage
summer 2008 usage
winter 2008 usage
square feet
heat pump
vintage
SF home
brick
frame
siding

5779.081
6572.229
5424.801
6178.023
1788.557
0.642857
4.030612
0.70068
0.061225
0.054422
0.836735

CEM2

QHEC
treatment
group
5745.573
6618.136
5404.673
6206.095
1788.143
0.642857
4.030612
0.70068
0.061225
0.054422
0.836735
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Table 7. DDD model. Dep. variable: ln Electricity use. Treatment: Quick Home Energy Audit.
Simplified
Simplified DDD
DDD
Full DDD
Full DDD
(summers 2010(summers
No weights
CEM 1 weights
11)
only)
CEM 1 weights
CEM 1 weights
Regressors or fixed effects from equation (1):
-0.0250
-0.0340
-0.0344
-0.0278
Treatment Dummy
(-2.04)
(-1.75)
(-2.15)
(-2.26)
Household 
season FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Season  year FE

Yes

Yes

n/a

Yes

Household  year
FE

Yes

Yes

No

No

weather controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

16,125

26,394

Matching variables to control for any residual imbalance:
Benchmark year
No*
No*
usage
house
No
No
characteristics
Number
106,501
108,387
observations
* absorbed into the hhold-year FE
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Table 8. DDD model. Dep. variable: ln Electricity use. Treatment: Quick Home Energy Audit.
Full DDD
no weights

Full DDD
CEM 2 weights

Simplified DDD
(summers 201011)
CEM 2 weights

Simplified DDD
(summers only)
CEM 2 weights

Regressors or fixed effects from equation (1):
Treatment
Dummy

-0.0278
(-2.04)

-0.0544
(-3.63)

-0.0480
(-4.61)

-0.0479
(-2.86)

Household 
season FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Season  year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Household 
year FE

Yes

Yes

No

No

Weather controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Matching variables to control for any residual imbalance:
Benchmark year
usage

No*

No*

Yes

Yes

house
characteristics

No*

No*

Yes

Yes

Number
observations

108,387

37,511

5,780

9,338

* absorbed into the hhold-year FE
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Table 9. Coarsened exact matching (CEM) results. Heat pump households v. control households
with heat pumps.

CEM 1

CEM 2

Matching variables

- 2008 usage

- 2008 usage
- House characteristics

Matched households

6681
(97.45%)

3603
(33.33%)

Nobs used in the final regression

112,326
(97.65%)

60,763
(33.50%)

36
Table 10. DDD model. Dep. variable: ln Electricity use. Treatment: Heat Pump rebate.
Simplified
DDD
Simplified DDD
Full DDD
Full DDD
(summers
(summers only)
No weights
CEM 1 weights
2010-11)
CEM 1 weights
CEM 1 weights
Regressors or fixed effects from equation (1):
-0.0430
-0.0375
-0.0373
-0.0546
Treatment Dummy
(-3.15)
(-2.68)
(-3.01)
(-3.15)
Household 
season FE

Yes

Yes

Season  year

Yes

Yes

Household  year
FE

Yes

Yes

No

No

Weather controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

10,209

16,735

Matching variables to control for any residual imbalance:
Benchmark year
No*
No*
usage
House
No
No
characteristics
Number
67,604
68,754
observations
* absorbed into the hhold-year FE

Yes

Yes
Yes
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Table 11. DDD model. Dep. variable: ln Electricity use. Treatment: Heat Pump rebate.
Simplified
DDD
Simplified DDD
Full DDD
Full DDD
(summers
(summers only)
No weights
CEM 2 weights
2010-11)
CEM 2 weights
CEM 2 weights
Regressors or fixed effects from equation (1):
-0.0419
-0.0202
-0.0202
-0.0546
Treatment Dummy
(-3.15)
(-2.49)
(-1.52)
(-1.65)
Household 
season FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Season  year

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Household  year
FE

Yes

Yes

No

No

Weather controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

10,209

16,735

Matching variables to control for residual imbalance:
Benchmark year
No*
No*
usage
House
No*
No*
characteristics
Number
33,268
68,754
observations
* absorbed into the Household-year FE
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Appendix.
Table A.1 Summary of ATT estimates using Mahalanobis-distance and propensity score
matching. QHEC.

Number
Nearest
Neighbors

Distance Based Matching
Outcome
Usage
Diff 2011 and
and 2010
dwelling
by Quarter data

Usage
data
only

Propensity Score Matching
Usage
Usage
and
data
dwelling
only
data

3
Q2
-0.036
-0.020
-0.030
-0.033
3
Q3
-0.051 *
-0.037 *
-0.048 ** -0.064
3
Q4
-0.014
-0.003
-0.011
-0.029
5
Q2
-0.037
-0.019
-0.026
-0.033
5
Q3
-0.051 *
-0.036 *
-0.046 * -0.048
5
Q4
-0.011
-0.005
-0.011
-0.016
7
Q2
-0.038
-0.017
-0.023
-0.032
7
Q3
-0.053 *
-0.038 *
-0.044 * -0.053
7
Q4
-0.012
-0.004
-0.013
-0.017
11
Q2
-0.035
-0.018
-0.025
-0.025
11
Q3
-0.054 ** -0.036 *
-0.040 * -0.050
11
Q4
-0.013
-0.006
-0.014
-0.012
*** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%
Note: all specifications balance using conventional tests and the PSM standard
errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications.

**
**
*
*

**

**
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Table A.2 Summary of ATT estimates using Mahalanobis-distance and propensity
score matching. Heat pump rebate.

Distance Based Matching - Mahalanobis

Propensity Score Matching

Outcome
Usage
Usage
Number
Diff 2011
and
Usage
and
Usage
Nearest
and 2010
dwelling
data
dwelling
data
Neighbors
by Quarter data
only
data
only
3
Q2
-0.005
-0.004
-0.002
0.002
3
Q3
-0.025
-0.032 **
-0.030
-0.030 **
3
Q4
-0.022 *
-0.030 **
-0.004
-0.009
5
Q2
-0.006
-0.005
-0.006
-0.001
5
Q3
-0.024
-0.029 **
-0.039 ** -0.024
5
Q4
-0.020
-0.025 *
-0.011
-0.003
7
Q2
-0.005
-0.004
0.000
0.000
7
Q3
-0.020
-0.029 *
-0.035 ** -0.016
7
Q4
-0.020
-0.021
-0.007
-0.004
11
Q2
-0.002
-0.004
0.001
0.006
11
Q3
-0.016
-0.028 *
-0.032 * -0.024
11
Q4
-0.021
-0.017
-0.006
-0.003
*** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%
Note: all specifications balance using conventional tests and the PSM standard errors
are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications.

